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Gendered Wealth Losses after Dissolution of Cohabitation but not Marriage in Germany 
Diederik Boertien1 & Philipp M. Lersch2 
Objective: To document gender differences in how economic wealth changes following the 
dissolution of marriage and cohabitation in Germany. 
Background: Wealth can be an important resource to deal with the adverse economic 
consequences of union dissolution. Marital property regimes usually ensure that both 
partners receive a share of the couples’ wealth following a divorce. The dissolution of 
cohabiting unions is not governed by such rules in most countries, including Germany, 
which may lead to a more unequal division of wealth following the dissolution of 
cohabitation as compared to marriage. 
Method: The analysis consists of multivariable fixed-effects regression models based on 
longitudinal data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (N = 6,388 individuals) for the 
years 2002 to 2017. 
Results: Changes in wealth are relatively similar for men and women after the dissolution of 
marriage. The dissolution of cohabiting unions is related to losses in wealth for women, but 
not for men. Controlling for post-dissolution processes, gender inequality increases after the 
dissolution of cohabitations. 
Conclusion: Union dissolution is associated with wealth losses. The legal protection of the 
economically weaker spouse in marriage prevents gender inequality in these wealth losses. 
Lacking such legal protection, cohabitation is associated with gender inequality in the 
consequences of dissolution.  
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How consequential are union dissolutions for individuals’ economic resources and their 
financial wellbeing? A large body of literature has documented how household income 
drops after union dissolution (Andreß et al. 2006; McManus & DiPrete, 2001; Smock, 1994; 
Uunk, 2004; Van Damme et al., 2008). Given that these economic consequences are greater 
for women (Andreß et al. 2006; DiPrete & McManus, 2000; Van Damme et al., 2008), 
union dissolution has become a factor that contributes to gender inequality in economic 
resources. What is missing from this relatively large body of literature on the economic 
consequences of union dissolution is what happens with men’s and women’s wealth after a 
union dissolution (exceptions are Addo & Lichter, 2013; Painter et al., 2015; Wilmoth & 
Koso, 2002; Zagorsky, 2005). 
It is important to include wealth in the study of the economic consequences of union 
dissolution for several reasons. First, union dissolution is a potential driver behind wealth 
inequality between individuals (Zagorsky, 2005). Secondly, accumulated wealth can be 
employed to cushion the impact of a separation on a person’s standard of living (Killewald 
et al., 2017). How well men and women are able to deal with a union dissolution is 
dependent on initial levels of household wealth, how wealth is split between partners, and 
differences in individual wealth accumulation following a break-up. Even though income 
differences following union dissolution predominantly favor men, (parts of) wealth is in 
principle split equally among partners following a legal divorce (depending on the legal 
context). In some legal contexts, women might claim larger parts of household wealth due to 
their higher financial need following dissolution (Smith, 2002). If this is the case, wealth can 
turn out to be an important resource cushioning gender differences in the overall economic 
consequences of union dissolution.  
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At the same time, there are several reasons to believe that wealth trajectories of ex-
partners might diverge following union dissolution. First of all, the division of wealth 
following a divorce will be influenced by the marital property regime of the context studied. 
In Germany, the country-case of our study, the default property regime stipulates equal 
sharing of wealth accrued during marriage. There are important exceptions to this default 
regime: Pre-marriage wealth and inheritances are not shared and through prenuptial 
agreements the default property regime may be modified. Given that women are likely to 
bring less wealth into the marriage (Sierminska et al., 2010) we expect them to leave a 
relationship with less wealth, too. 
Secondly, the separation of cohabiting unions is not governed by the same rules as 
marriage (Perelli-Harris & Sánchez Gassen, 2012). Even though wealth accumulated during 
marriage is normally split equally between partners, this is not necessarily the case for 
wealth accumulated during cohabitation. Given the higher earnings of men as compared to 
women, men are likely to generate more (financial) wealth during relationships as compared 
to women (Lersch, 2017). After the dissolution of a marriage, women normally have the 
right to half of this accumulated wealth, but within cohabitation women might not be able to 
claim such a share. The dissolution of cohabiting unions might therefore have more gender 
unequal consequences as compared to the dissolution of marriages.  
In short, there are important reasons to expect that only examining income 
underestimates gender inequality in the economic consequences of union dissolution. The 
division of wealth may amplify rather than dampen the gendered consequences of union 
dissolution. In this study, we use longitudinal data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(SOEP) to document changes in wealth of individuals before and after union dissolution. 
The main questions we ask are: Do changes in per capita wealth differ between men and 
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women after union dissolution? Do these gender differences vary between the dissolution of 
cohabitation and marriage? 
Our results indicate that both men and women end up with less wealth after 
dissolution of marriage and changes in wealth are relatively similar for men and women. At 
the same time, we find that the dissolution of cohabiting unions is related to wealth losses 
for women (6.5 percentage points in the per capita wealth rank), but not for men. If future 
research confirms and consolidates this finding, and if cohabitation becomes more prevalent 
compared to marriage, union dissolution might become an increasingly important 
determinant of gender differences in wealth. 
BACKGROUND 
Gender, Union Dissolution, and Wealth 
A handful of studies have documented how union dissolution relates to wealth in the United 
States (Addo & Lichter, 2013; Halpern-Manners et al., 2015; Painter et al., 2015; Wilmoth 
& Koso, 2002; Zagorsky, 2005). These studies have generally examined household wealth 
of individuals at a given point in time depending on partnership trajectories experienced in 
the past (with the exception of the analysis of changes over time performed by Zagorsky 
[2005]). Individuals who experienced a union dissolution are found to have lower household 
wealth compared to continuously partnered people (Addo & Lichter, 2013; Painter et al., 
2015; Wilmoth & Koso, 2002; Zagorsky, 2005). Findings regarding re-marriage have been 
mixed. Some studies found re-marriage to dampen or eliminate the effects of union 
dissolution (Painter et al., 2015; Wilmoth & Koso, 2002), but other studies found persisting 
disadvantage after re-marriage (Addo & Lichter, 2013). 
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Several mechanisms have been suggested to underlie this empirical regularity. 
Firstly, economies of scale make it cheaper for two individuals to live together instead of 
having to maintain two separate households. Union dissolution implies losses of these 
economies of scale. In addition, at least one partner must find new accommodation. The 
costs related to such a move are likely to reduce the overall stock of wealth of the two 
former partners (Zagorsky, 2005). Secondly, direct costs of legal divorce may reduce wealth 
after marriage. Thirdly, besides economies of scale there are other reasons why persons in a 
union accumulate more wealth as compared to single individuals; these include possible tax 
benefits and increased incentives to save (Lersch, 2017; Vespa & Painter, 2011). Union 
dissolution will put an end to such benefits related to being in a union. Fourthly, behavior 
changes following separation (Zagorsky, 2005) and these changes might affect earnings, 
consumption, and saving. In particular, many women who end up with custody of dependent 
children might have to reduce their labor supply following a break-up (Van Damme et al., 
2008). Lastly, individuals who end a union might be selected in terms of their economic 
resources as compared to individuals who stay with their partner. The cross-sectional 
differences in wealth observed in some of the previous studies (Addo & Lichter, 2013; 
Wilmoth & Koso, 2002) might therefore reflect pre-existing economic disadvantage rather 
than a causal effect of union dissolution.  
Two previous studies looked at gender differences in the effects of marital histories 
on wealth and found mixed results. Zagorsky (2005) found women’s wealth to be slightly 
more affected, but concluded that divorce “destroys wealth dramatically for both sexes” (p. 
418). Wilmoth and Koso (2002) did not find significant gender differences in the effects of 
separation from first marriages, but found such differences for separation from higher order 
   7 
marriages and for divorce (regardless of union order). No study has examined changes in 
wealth after the dissolution of cohabitation. 
In short, existing research has paid little attention to the question whether there are 
gender differences in the consequences of union dissolution for wealth. Why might we 
expect such gender differences to exist? We propose three general reasons that will be 
discussed in turn: rules specific to marital property regimes, wealth accumulation within 
cohabitation, and gender differences in post-separation processes. In our study, we focus on 
the first two processes and our substantive interest is in understanding the role of pre-
dissolution characteristics of unions for the post-dissolution wealth of both ex-partners. 
 
Marital Property Regimes 
Divorce marks the legal end of marriage where the final re-distribution of wealth is settled 
according to marital property regimes. We expect that partners anticipate these legal 
obligations and, therefore, that the consequences of dissolution of marriage already emerge 
with the end of co-residence of both partners when they divide their property. 
The extent to which wealth is shared after a divorce depends on the legal context 
studied. What parts of wealth are divided after divorce and what the leading principle is to 
achieve an equitable distribution of assets differs across countries. In some countries, such 
as England and Wales, “need” is the leading principle to determine the distribution of all 
property and judges have great discretion in dividing assets (Smith, 2002). Given that needs 
vary across individuals such a system might lead to an unequal division of wealth after 
divorce. Given that children often co-reside with the mother after a divorce and because 
women in general earn less, their financial need is on average higher after dissolution 
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compared to men. Systems that take into account financial need might therefore end up 
giving relatively more wealth to women as compared to other systems. 
In other countries, wealth is in principle divided equally across former partners, 
which might lead partners with more financial needs to end up in an economically more 
difficult position. In some countries, such as the Nordic countries, all wealth is divided 
equally across partners, whereas in others only wealth accumulated during the marriage is 
split, such as in Germany (Smith, 2002) the country of our study. Men in general accumulate 
more (financial) wealth within marriage, and bring more wealth to the marriage, possibly 
due to their age and status differences at union formation (Lersch, 2017). Hence, the more 
wealth is covered by marital property regimes, the smaller the gender gap in wealth is likely 
to be following divorce.  
In the United States, property regimes differ across states, but in general take into 
account need, and in several states all wealth of the couple is divided, including wealth 
accumulated before marriages (Voena, 2015). Most divorce cases end up in an equal 
division of wealth in the United States (Zagorsky, 2005). But, the relatively weak evidence 
for the existence of a gender gap in wealth following divorce—all based on the United 
States—might not generalize to other contexts that have different marital property regimes 
in place. 
Finally, rising divorce rates might make couples more wary of entering into a union 
that leads to a possible high loss in wealth in the case of divorce. Prenuptial agreements 
might therefore have become more relevant (Rainer, 2007) and might have led to a less 
equal division of wealth following divorces today. At least for France, evidence indeed 
showed that married couples increasingly sign prenuptial agreements and separate their 
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wealth (Frémeaux & Leturcq, 2018). For Germany, these trends have not yet been 
examined.  
Wealth Accumulation within Cohabitation  
If the law makes the distribution of wealth after divorce relatively equal, the division of 
wealth might be less equal after the dissolution of cohabiting unions, which are not governed 
by the same legal rules. In that case, increasing levels of cohabitation might give rise to a 
gender gap in how household wealth is divided following union dissolution.  
Countries differ in the extent to which cohabitation is legally regulated. Cohabiting 
couples normally do not have to inform authorities about the dissolution of their union, and 
if so, procedures are relatively simple (Perelli-Harris & Sánchez Gassen, 2012). Some 
countries mention cohabiting unions in their laws, but the dissolution of cohabiting 
relationships remains largely unregulated, with the partial exceptions of Sweden, Norway, 
and registered partnerships in France and the Netherlands. In Germany, the country case of 
our study, the dissolution of cohabiting unions is not governed by laws with the exception of 
alimony payments if the couple recently had a child (Perelli-Harris & Sánchez Gassen, 
2012:448). The division of wealth after union dissolution will therefore primarily depend on 
the couple’s decisions and the legal ownership of assets and debts. 
The higher earnings potential of men is likely to lead to an unequal accumulation of 
wealth within relationships (Lersch, 2017). In most countries and cases such wealth is split 
within marriage, but this is not the case for wealth accumulated within cohabitation. Gender 
differences in how wealth is split are therefore, ceterus paribus, likely to be more 
pronounced after the dissolution of cohabitation as compared to divorce. Similarly, men 
bring more wealth to relationships (Sierminska et al., 2010). Especially in countries where 
pre-marriage wealth is divided between partners after divorce but not after the dissolution of 
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a cohabiting union, the gender gap in wealth losses after the dissolution of cohabitation as 
compared to divorce might therefore be stark. 
 
Post-dissolution Processes 
Direct information on how wealth is split between partners will not be available in most 
empirical settings. Instead, wealth is normally measured at a given point in time before and 
after the event (e.g. Zagorsky, 2005). Estimates of how wealth is split will therefore rely on 
estimating the distinct changes in wealth for both partners after union dissolution. In such 
settings, gender differences in wealth will be influenced by post-dissolution processes. Two 
such processes appear important to highlight: variation in earnings, consumption, and 
savings on the one hand, and re-partnering on the other hand.  
Given the greater economic consequences of union dissolution for women in terms of 
household income, and the greater economic need of women living with children (Andreß et 
al. 2006; McManus & DiPrete, 2001; Smock, 1994; Uunk, 2004; Van Damme et al., 2008), 
separated women are likely to consume more and save less as compared to separated men. 
This will result in gender differences in wealth trajectories following union dissolution 
favoring men.  
Studies on the changes in wealth following divorce have generally found re-
partnering to offset part of its negative effects of union dissolution on women’s wealth 
(Painter et al., 2015; Wilmoth & Koso, 2002). However, given that men in general re-partner 
more often and faster (Di Nallo, 2019), re-partnering might actually increase the average gap 
in wealth between men and women following union dissolution.  
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This Study: Union Dissolution and Wealth in Germany 
In this article, we study union dissolution in 21st century Germany. We follow individuals 
across time in order to estimate changes in per capita wealth after union dissolution. Given 
our interest in how all household wealth is split after a couple breaks up, per capita wealth is 
more appropriate for our purposes as compared to measures of individual wealth (i.e. based 
on the legal ownership of wealth).  
Previous studies have found some gender differences in wealth following divorce in 
the United States (Wilmoth & Koso, 2002; Zagorsky, 2005). We expect to find clearer 
gender differences in our study for two reasons: (a) In Germany, important parts of wealth 
are not divided after divorce (i.e. pre-marriage wealth), whereas this is not the case in all 
states of the United States; (b) we include cohabiting unions where no division of wealth is 
required after dissolution. If men indeed bring more wealth into unions and accumulate more 
wealth within unions in general, which appears to be the case (Lersch, 2017), women should 
end up with less wealth after union dissolution as compared to men in Germany. 
Besides estimating the overall change in per capita wealth after union dissolution, a 
second major goal of this article is to test the argument whether wealth is split less evenly 
after cohabitation as compared to marriage.  
Differences between cohabitation and marriage have not been studied longitudinally 
in previous research. In Germany, differences between cohabitation and marriage are likely 
to be smaller as compared to countries where pre-marriage wealth is divided after divorce. 
At the same time, differences between cohabitation and marriage can be expected to be 
larger in Germany than in contexts which legally regulate cohabitation. 
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DATA & METHOD 
Data 
We use longitudinal data from the Socio-economic Panel (Goebel et al., 2019) covering the 
period 2002-2017. The SOEP is a panel survey interviewing a representative sample of the 
German population on an annual basis. Information on wealth has been collected by the 
SOEP every five years since 2002. In the current study, we therefore use information on 
wealth from four measurement points (2002, 2007, 2012, 2017) and waves in between are 
used for additional variables. 
Sample 
We construct two samples for the analysis selecting all respondents who were either in (a) a 
co-residential relationship or (b) married during any of the four waves with information on 
wealth. We follow them from the first wave they are in a union until the end of the 
observation period. Respondents that marry their cohabiting partner are censored in the 
cohabitation sample and enter the marriage sample. We restrict the sample to respondents 
aged 18 to 79, to private households, and to household heads and their partners. We exclude 
same-sex couples and extension samples without wealth measurement. We subsequently 
construct a person-year dataset with information from all waves for which individuals 
provided information on wealth. This setup allows us to examine differences in pre-
dissolution and post-dissolution wealth. 
We draw on multiply imputed wealth data from the SOEP team. Additionally, around 
1% of the sample contains missing information on the dissolution and control variables. We 
multiply impute 40 possible values for missing information and use the resulting 40 imputed 
datasets in the analysis. This results in a final sample of 836 individuals who cohabited 
during the observation window and a sample size of 5,552 for our analysis of marriage 
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dissolution. Table 1 shows the number of persons included in the final sample and 
separation events for men, women, married and cohabiting individuals used in the final 
analysis.  
Table 1. Sample Sizes and Number of Events Recorded 
 Women Men 
Cohabiting persons 428 408 
Number of dissolutions from cohabitation 209 183 
Married persons 2,871 2,681 
Number of dissolutions from marriage 302 197 
 
Measurement 
Wealth. The outcome of interest is total net wealth (all assets minus debts and loans). 
Assets include real estate, financial assets, life insurance, private pension plans, businesses 
and debts include mortgages, loans, and other debts. The SOEP collects wealth at the 
individual level. When collecting data on collectively owned assets and debts, each 
individual is asked how ownership of this asset is shared between household members. We 
focus on per capita wealth, which is operationalized as total household net wealth divided by 
the number of household members aged 18 or above. Wealth is adjusted for price inflation 
(set to prices of 2015) and its distribution is winsorized at the 0.1 and 99.9 percentiles.  
Wealth is a highly skewed variable, but given that wealth has both positive and 
negative values, commonly used transformations (such as the natural logarithm) would 
exclude important information from the analysis. The two most common ways to transform 
wealth are to calculate a rank measure or to employ the Inverse Hyperbolic Sine (IHS)-
transformation (Killewald et al., 2017). In our case, the advantage of using a rank-based 
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measure is that it more effectively accounts for periodic changes in the distribution of wealth 
(and hence effect sizes) and provides easy to interpret results. In the main analysis, we 
therefore use individuals’ rank in the wealth distribution as the dependent variable. This rank 
is calculated for each wave separately jointly for men and women and indicates the 
proportion of cases having less wealth than the individual considered and ranges from 0 to 1. 
In robustness checks, we use the IHS-transformed version of the per capita wealth variable 
with a theta of 0.0001 (Friedline et al., 2015). 
Union Dissolution. We define union dissolution similarly for cohabitation and 
marriage: an individuals’ partner who was observed in the household in a given wave is not 
in the household anymore in the next wave with information on wealth and the partner has 
not died. We do not consider cases as dissolution if partners are again observed in the same 
household in later waves. For individuals who experienced the dissolution of a union, this 
variable takes on the value 1 for all waves following dissolution. Thus, after marriage we do 
not differentiate between end of co-residence and divorce in the main analysis, but provide 
robustness checks focusing on divorce. Person-years before dissolution take on the value of 
0, and this counts for all the person-years of individuals who did not experience a 
dissolution between 2002 and 2017, too. 
In our analysis, we compare changes in wealth following the dissolution of 
cohabiting unions to changes after the dissolution from marriage. For these comparisons, we 
estimate results separately for a subsample of marriages and a subsample of cohabiting 
unions. In additional analysis, we also consider the variable Time since dissolution which 
captures the waves elapsed since the partner was not observed in the same household 
anymore and Union duration before dissolution. 
